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SNYDER V. PHELPS, OUTRAGEOUSNESS, AND THE
OPEN TEXTURE OF TORT LAW
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
INTRODUCTION
On March 8, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Albert Snyder's
certiorari petition in his lawsuit against Frederick Phelps, Rebekah
Phelps-Davis, Shirley Phelps-Roper, and the Westboro Baptist
Church.' The Phelps trio and their children and grandchildren trav-
elled from Topeka, Kansas, to Westminster, Maryland, in order to
picket the funeral that Albert Snyder had arranged for his son, Mat-
thew Snyder, who was killed in the line of duty in Iraq.2 Carrying
signs with statements such as "God hates the USA," "God hates you,"
"Fag troops," and "Thank God for dead soldiers," the Phelpses staged
a public protest that was covered by the media.3 Although not con-
tending that Snyder was gay, their message was that the killing of
American soldiers in general and Snyder in particular was the just
consequence of America's increasing moral turpitude, heinously illus-
trated by its tolerance of gays in society, its widespread adultery, and
many other allegedly vile aspects of contemporary American life.4
* Associate Dean for Research, Professor & James H. Quinn Chair, Fordham University
School of Law. I am grateful to Thomas Holber for helpful research, to James Brudney, Abner
Greene, Leslie Kendrick, David Partlett, Catherine Sharkey and participants in the Columbia
Law School's Legal Theory Workshop for comments on an earlier draft, and to Stephan Lands-
man and the editors of the DePaul Law Review for their flexibility and patience.
1. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737
(2010). Snyder's petition for certiorari stated three issues for review:
1. Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell apply to a private person versus another pri-
vate person concerning a private matter? 2. Does the First Amendment's freedom of
speech tenet trump the First Amendment's freedom of religion and peaceful assembly?
3. Does an individual attending a family member's funeral constitute a captive audience
who is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Snyder, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 09-751). In granting the petition, the
Supreme Court only stated, "Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit granted." Snyder, 130 S. Ct. at 1737.
2. In the words of U.S. District Judge Richard D. Bennett, "The facts of this case as presented
at trial were largely undisputed." Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder 1), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md.
2008).
3. Id. at 572.
4. See id. at 571-72.
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Driving home this point was an "Epic" posted on their website enti-
tled "The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder." 5
Albert Snyder was allegedly saddened, sickened, and overwhelmed
by this turn of events-by the conversion of a funeral for his fallen-
soldier son into a publicity circus for an out-of-state religious extrem-
ist group.6 He therefore sued the Phelps contingent for intrusion on
seclusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress, publicity
given to private life, civil conspiracy, and defamation.7 A jury in fed-
eral court in the District of Maryland returned a verdict of $2.9 million
in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, which
the district judge reduced to $2.1 million in punitive damages.8 How-
ever, in September of 2009, a panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that Snyder's claims failed as a
matter of First Amendment law because the defendants were expres-
sing views on matters of public concern and did not seriously assert
anything provably false about Snyder or his son.9
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Snyder v. Phelps
in October of 2010.10 While the manuscript for this Article was in
final pages, the Supreme Court issued an 8-1 decision affirming the
decision of the Fourth Circuit." Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opin-
ion for the Court, and Justice Alito was the sole dissenting Justice;
Justice Breyer wrote a short concurring opinion, while joining the ma-
jority opinion. Because this Article was virtually complete prior to
the issuance of the Court's opinion, the bulk of the Article relates to
the Fourth Circuit's opinion and to the arguments that were before
the Supreme Court rather than to Chief Justice Roberts's opinion.
However, a Postscript addressing the Court's opinion was hastily ap-
pended after the Court's opinion was released. 12 As indicated in the
Postscript and previewed below, the analysis in the central portions of
the Article speaks to one of Chief Justice Roberts's critical arguments
for the funeral picketers.
5. Id. at 572.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 573, 595.
9. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737
(2010).
10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Snyder v. Phelps (No. 09-751).
11. Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder 111), No. 09-751 (Mar. 2, 2011).
12. The Postscript turns briefly to the Supreme Court's March 2, 2011 opinion in Snyder. Sec-
tion A of the Postscript analyzes Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice Alito's separate opinions,
utilizing the background of this Article to shed light on which issues were avoided and which
emphasized by the Court; Section B offers a critique of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion drawn
from the work completed in the earlier parts of this Article.
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I suggest in what follows that the Fourth Circuit's analysis of First
Amendment precedent and its application to Snyder was deeply
flawed. The critique of the Fourth Circuit's analysis is merely a prel-
ude to the larger questions of this Article, however. The principal
issue is whether the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
may be used to support a claim by a grieving family member against
those who engage in a peaceful demonstration vigorously expressing
extremist political and religious views at the funeral of a private indi-
vidual. The issue has a constitutional aspect (which is why it is at the
Court) and a tort aspect. The constitutional question is whether the
imposition of tort liability would be a violation of the First Amend-
ment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. The tort issue
is whether tort liability is justifiable under such circumstances and, if
so, on what theory or theories.
While some of the discussion of Snyder will be framed by the First
Amendment issues that have taken it to the Supreme Court, the con-
stitutional dimensions of the case are linked to our underlying theo-
retical inquiry in several important ways. For at the heart of the most
promising constitutional argument against Snyder, I shall argue, is a
form of what is in essence a jurisprudential critique: that the vague-
ness of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
creates so much uncertainty and pliability that it should be struck
down. The "outrageousness" idea at the heart of the IIED claim is
plainly a morally charged concept. Whether a standards-driven tort
law like this is inconsistent with constitutional values is, in effect, the
overarching issue faced by the Court. It is also the central question
faced in this Article. I argue that Snyder's claim should remain alive
because the open-textured quality of the torts and the imposition of
liability upon the Phelpses are entirely consistent with the
Constitution.
Part II of this Article describes the facts of Albert Snyder's lawsuit
and its journey from federal district court in Maryland through the
Fourth Circuit to the United States Supreme Court.13 Its primary fo-
cus is the majority opinion of the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the
plaintiff's judgment and, in particular, the First Amendment analysis
underlying that opinion. Part III is a critique of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion. 14 A critical premise of that opinion was that plaintiffs do not
avoid the Supreme Court's defamation law precedent merely by as-
serting nominally different causes of action.15 While there is some
13. See infra notes 24-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
15. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
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truth in that premise, the Fourth Circuit overinflated its significance
and extended libel precedents far beyond their breaking point. Sny-
der is therefore indefensible in the terms proposed by the Fourth
Circuit.
Part IV focuses on the wider free speech issues presented by the
Snyder case and articulates a stronger and more candid rationale for
the Fourth Circuit's opinion. 16 The rationale is that public political
protests are protected by the First Amendment and that neither of the
torts asserted by the plaintiff protects interests clear enough to cir-
cumvent the First Amendment shield. More particularly, some schol-
ars have suggested that the IIED cause of action-with its focus on
outrageousness-is inherently malleable in ways that are intolerable
to First Amendment values.17 The vagueness, moral content, and un-
certainty of the tort norms in outrage and intrusion present a particu-
larly sharp challenge to the First Amendment right of peaceful
political speech. Or so the argument goes.
In Part V, I take a break from Snyder to make a more general point:
tort law's open texture and heavy reliance upon standards rather than
rules are not features that can be judged purely in abstraction.' 8 The
law-like qualities of some domains of putative law will depend on how
the courts applying this law conceive of the state's political role, the
court's institutional role, the role of the jury, and the place within tort
doctrine of precedent, custom, tradition, and a paradigm-based con-
ception of tort causes of action. The common law of torts utilizes sev-
eral tools to control and counterbalance the risks of depending too
heavily upon open-ended standards and moral principles. A jurispru-
dential or constitutional critique of a tort must remain attentive to the
reasons that tort law proceeds in terms of standards, to the benefits of
16. See infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text.
17. Professor Eugene Volokh is probably the best known of these scholars. See Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CAR-
i)ozo L. REV. DE Novo 300, available at www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com
content&view= article&id=149:volokh2010300&catid=21:funerals-fire-and-brimstone&Itemid
=26 [hereinafter Volokh, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress]; Eugene Volokh, The Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort and the Freedom of Speech, Ti i VoI.oKF CONSPIR-
ACY (Mar. 8, 2010, 1:55 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/03/08/the-intentional-infliction-of-
emotional-distress-tort-and-the-freedom-of-speech-2/ [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech].
There are, however, several articles in law reviews making this and related points, in general, and
as to Snyder, in particular. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, War, Death, Politics & Religion: An Emotion-
ally Distressing Amalgamation for Freedom of Speech and the Expression of Opinion, 30 Wilir-
TIER L. REv. 207 (2008); Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151
(2008). The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107
(Ariz. 2005), is also supportive of this line of argument. The other articles, like Volokh's, address
aspects of the Snyder case going to the Supreme Court.
18. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
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doing so, and to the adjudicative norms that safeguard our system
against the perils of uncertainty.
Parts VI and VII utilize the framework set forth in Part V to ex-
amine the general, vagueness-based critique of the tort of IIED19 and
its application to the facts of Snyder,20 respectively. We should look
to see whether the putative tort or torts in this case are fairly under-
stood as an application of a body of principles and concepts with some
integrity within the common law, or as a slap-dash pasting of facts
about politically odd, unconventional, and provocative speech onto a
newfangled, random torts framework. To the extent that it is the lat-
ter, the application of the First Amendment to undercut this tort claim
arguably reflects judicial review doing its work, albeit aggressively. To
the extent that it is the former, a novel First Amendment argument
for slapping it down reflects simply a superficial jurisprudential cri-
tique masking a strong and unwarranted bias against the rights, princi-
ples, and dignitary values that state tort law aspires to embody.
Snyder's IIED claim in the district court represented a wholly legiti-
mate application of substantive tort law in Maryland, even as it also
represented an instance in which open-ended moral principles are ap-
plied by the jury against unpopular protesters and speakers. For the
outrageousness of the Phelpses' behavior in this case does not lie
predominantly in the sentiments or ideas expressed, but in the life ex-
perience with which they intentionally interfered: Albert Snyder's ef-
fort to hold a funeral for his son. The tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress through outrageous conduct has a substantial his-
tory within a certain category of conduct: interference with funerals in
general and with a family's grieving process more particularly. As
scores of state courts have recognized in the context of outrage and
the U.S. Supreme Court itself recognized in its unanimous 2003 deci-
sion, National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish,21 the law
does acknowledge that "[f]amily members have a personal stake in
honoring and mourning their dead" and does not protect the activity
of one who, "by intruding upon [the family members'] grief, tends to
degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased per-
son who was once their own." 22
Those who complain that the concept of outrageousness is too
vague and subjective to withstand First Amendment scrutiny are ig-
noring the structure of the common law of torts, in general, and oper-
19. See infra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 156-95 and accompanying text.
21. Nat'I Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
22. Id. at 168.
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ating without an adequate understanding of the tort of IIED, in
particular. Tort law, unlike criminal law or regulation, is not a series
of general prohibitions or restrictions promulgated and then enforced
by the state. It is a system for empowering private parties to use the
courts to redress wrongful injuries done to them by others. This does
not mean due process disappears and vagueness does not matter, but
it does mean that the rule-of-law norms that the Due Process Clause is
understood to entail, particularly within our federalist system, cannot
be evaluated in quite the way that one would evaluate a criminal stat-
ute. What is critical-apart from jurisdictional concerns-is that the
plaintiff's claim be anchored as an injury to him; that the law's treat-
ment of his conduct as a wrongful injuring of the plaintiff be ade-
quately rooted in precedent and social understanding regarding the
wrongs and rights of community members; that the precedent and so-
cial understanding reflect a legitimate conceptualization of correlative
rights and duties; and that the individual upon whom liability is im-
posed can, in some sense, be expected to be aware that the community
regards the kind of injuring he did to the plaintiff as a wrongful injur-
ing. Looked at from this point of view, the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress through outrageous conduct is almost tailor-
made to respect community members' rights to be free of tort liability
for emotional harm in all but the rarest case. The conduct of the
Phelpses in Westminster, Maryland, fell squarely within the domain in
which a private right of action for imposition of severe emotional dis-
tress is actionable.
Finally, the Postscript to this Article considers the Supreme Court's
March 3, 2011 decision in Snyder, offering a condensed critique of
Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion that proceeds from the
broader arguments laid out in the body of the Article. 23
II. SNYDER V. PHELPS
A. Facts
The events in March of 2006 that gave rise to the litigation in Snyder
v. Phelps occurred in the town of Westminster, Maryland, where
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder had lived and attended
high school.24 Lance Corporal Snyder died in Iraq on March 3, 2006.25
His father, Albert Snyder (Snyder), arranged a funeral at St. John's
23. See infra notes 196-216 and accompanying text.
24. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 569, 571 (D. Md. 2008).
25. Id.
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Catholic Church in Westminster for March 10, 2006.26 The funeral
was picketed by the defendants, Fred W. Phelps, Sr. (Phelps) and two
of his adult daughters, Shirley L. Phelps-Roper and Rebekah A.
Phelps-Davis, as well as four of Phelps's grandchildren, all of whom
had traveled from Topeka, Kansas, for the purpose of engaging in this
funeral picketing.27
The defendants "traveled to Matthew Snyder's funeral in order to
publicize their message of God's hatred of America for its tolerance of
homosexuality." 2 8 The Westboro Baptist Church, of which the protes-
ters were members, was also a defendant in the case. 29 The Church
was founded by Fred Phelps, and fifty of its sixty or seventy members
are progeny or in-laws of Phelps. 30 They realized that they could gen-
erate publicity for their message by protesting America's tolerance of
homosexuality at the funerals of soldiers killed in the war.31 They
have protested at funerals all around the country, and their protests
have garnered substantial public attention.32 Indeed, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that "[t]he Defendants have also been involved in litigation
throughout the country relating to their protests" and that "[a]s a re-
sult of such activities, approximately forty states and the federal gov-
ernment have enacted legislation addressing funeral picketing"; there
has, moreover, been substantial litigation over these statutes. 33
The protest at Matthew Snyder's funeral garnered substantial atten-
tion in Westminster. 34 In order to comply with legal ordinances,
Phelps and his family members notified public authorities in Maryland
before their arrival, and, according to Snyder, the Phelpses thereby
managed to turn the "funeral for his son into a 'media circus for their
benefit."' 35 Subsequent to the events in Westminster, Rebeka Phelps-
Roper wrote an "Epic" about the Snyder family, entitled "The Bur-
den of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder," which she posted on
www.godhatesfags.com, the Church's website.36 As the Fourth Circuit
described it, "Phelps-Roper stated that Albert Snyder and his ex-wife
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 571-72.
29. Id. at 572.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 571-72.
33. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545
F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008); Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008)), cert. granted,
130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).





'taught Matthew to defy his creator,' 'raised him for the devil,' and
'taught him that God was a liar.'"37
Snyder's arrival at St. John's Catholic Church for the funeral cir-
cumvented the protestors, whom he did not see picketing until watch-
ing television that night.3 8 Nevertheless, the knowledge that his son's
funeral had been turned into a "media circus" by the picketing of the
Phelpses, the awareness of his other family members' reactions to it,
and his own transformed experience of the funeral allegedly gener-
ated severe emotional injury.39 Snyder testified to the serious physical
and emotional effect the Phelpses' conduct had upon him and
presented expert testimony at trial as objective evidence of the physi-
cal and emotional harm he suffered. 40
Approximately three months after the funeral, Snyder sued Phelps
and the Westboro Baptist Church in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland; Phelps-Roper and Phelps-Davis were
subsequently added to the suit. 4 1 The complaint asserted two counts
of invasion of privacy-intrusion on seclusion and publicity given to
private life-as well as defamation and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; a fifth count of civil conspiracy linked each defendant
to the alleged tortious conduct of the others, much as criminal con-
spiracy claims do.4 2 On October 15, 2007, Judge Richard D. Bennett
granted summary judgment to the defendants on one of the invasion
of privacy claims-publicity given to private life-and on the defama-
tion claim.43 The remaining three claims were tried to a jury.44 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Snyder on all three counts as to
each of the four defendants: $2.9 million in compensatory damages
and a total of $8 million in punitive damages. 45 Judge Bennett denied
the defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
judgment as a matter of law on all claims, but remitted the $8 million
in punitive damage awards to $2.1 million.46
The defendants appealed the denial of their post-trial motions on
liability, arguing to the Fourth Circuit that the plaintiff's claims were
legally insufficient to withstand a judgment as a matter of law under
37. Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 212.
38. See Snyder 1, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 572-73, 588-89.




45. Id. at 573.
46. Id. at 595, 597.
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substantive Maryland tort law and were, in any case, barred by the
First Amendment. 47 In a thoughtful opinion for Judge Duncan and
himself, Judge King vacated the judgment and reversed the denial of
the motion for judgment as a matter of law, all on First Amendment
grounds.48 The Fourth Circuit opinion held that, because the defend-
ants' statements "[could not] reasonably be interpreted as stating ac-
tual facts about any individual," the complaint was barred by the First
Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.4 9 In April of 2010, the United States
Supreme Court granted Snyder's petition for certiorari.50
B. Fourth Circuit Opinion
The Fourth Circuit's opinion is best understood in the context of
examining three quite decisive steps taken by the district court in deal-
ing with the defendants' First Amendment challenge. First, the dis-
trict court held that the extent of First Amendment protection the
defendants were entitled to would depend on whether the plaintiff
Snyder was a public figure, in effect deciding that judgment as a mat-
ter of law on First Amendment grounds would not be appropriate un-
less Snyder was a public figure. Second, the district court determined
that Snyder was not a public figure.51 Third, it instructed the members
of the jury that it was up to them to "balance the Defendants' expres-
sion of religious belief with another citizen's right to privacy and his or
her right to be free from intentional, reckless, or extreme and outra-
geous conduct causing him or her severe emotional distress" and also
that it was up to the members of the jury to determine whether the
defendants' actions were "so offensive and shocking as to not be enti-
tled to First Amendment protection."52
Proceeding in reverse order, the Fourth Circuit quite justifiably bri-
dled at the district court's entrustment of First Amendment balancing
to the jury. "[Tihe district court," Judge King wrote, "fatally erred by
allowing the jury to decide relevant legal issues." 53 He concluded
that, at a minimum, the judgment for the plaintiff must be vacated and
a new trial granted. 54 However, reasoning that "a new trial is unnec-
47. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211, 216 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737
(2010).
48. Id. at 226.
49. Id. at 224, 226; see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
50. Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
51. Snyder 1, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
52. Snyder 1, 580 F.3d at 215 (quoting jury instruction No. 21).




essary if the Defendants can prevail as a matter of law after our inde-
pendent examination of the whole record," the Fourth Circuit turned
to the other potentially dispositive arguments put forward by the
defendants.55
The Fourth Circuit did not address the second question of whether
Snyder was a public figure. Instead, it criticized the district court's
decision that judgment as a matter of law was warranted only if Sny-
der were a public figure-that the case turned on whether Snyder was
a public figure or a private figure under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5 6
The district court erred by failing to consider the possibility that the
defendants would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on First
Amendment grounds regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public
figure.57 District Judge Bennett overlooked this possibility because he
failed to recognize that "[t]he Supreme Court has created a separate
line of First Amendment precedent that is specifically concerned with
the constitutional protections afforded to certain types of speech, and
that does not depend upon the public or private status of the speech's
target."58 Under Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 5 9 the Fourth Cir-
cuit reasoned, a claim is not actionable under the First Amendment
unless "the pertinent statements could reasonably be interpreted as
asserting 'actual facts' about an individual." 60
The key question not even asked by the district court, according to
the Fourth Circuit, was whether the Phelpses' statements could rea-
sonably be interpreted as asserting actual facts about an individual,
"or whether they instead merely contained rhetorical hyperbole."6'
The Fourth Circuit panel took it upon itself to address this question,
examining both the statements on the picket signs at the funeral and
the statements within the "Epic" posted on the defendants' website.62
The panel found that "no reasonable reader could interpret any of
these signs as asserting actual and objectively verifiable facts about
Snyder or his son"; that the signs "do not assert provable facts about
an individual"; and that "they clearly contain imaginative and hyper-
bolic rhetoric intended to spark debate about issues with which the
Defendants are concerned." 63 "Whether 'God hates' the United
55. Id. at 221-22.
56. Id. at 222; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
57. See Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 222.
58. Id.
59. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
60. Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 222 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).
61. Id. (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).
62. See id. at 222-26.
63. Id. at 223.
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States or a particular group, or whether America is 'doomed,' are mat-
ters of purely subjective opinion that cannot be put to objective verifi-
cation," reasoned the Fourth Circuit. 64 Insofar as Snyder's action was
based on the funeral picketing, it was properly subject to judgment as
a matter of law under Milkovich, regardless of whether Snyder was a
public or private figure.65
The court then applied the same analysis to the "Epic," which was
"patterned after the hyperbolic and figurative language used on the
various signs." 66 Similarly, when the Epic asserted "that the Snyders
raised their son 'for the devil,' and taught him to 'defy his Creator, to
divorce, and to commit adultery," 67 the reasonable reader would un-
derstand these assertions as "simply 'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language' not connoting actual facts about Matthew or his parents....
Thus, a reasonable reader would not understand the Epic to assert
actual facts about either Snyder or his son." 68
In light of this analysis of the language on the signs and in the Epic,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that judgment as a matter of law should
have been granted under the authority of Milkovich.69 In a concur-
ring opinion, Judge Shedd reasoned that judgment as a matter of law
for the defendants ought to have been granted on non-constitutional
grounds under a doctrine of constitutional avoidance, if there were
sufficient grounds for so ruling.70 He then determined that the evi-
dence on all of Snyder's claims was, under substantive Maryland tort
law, too weak to withstand the defendants' motion for judgment as a
matter of law.7 ' Judge King, who wrote the majority opinion for the
panel, and Judge Duncan, who concurred, declined to reach the ques-
tion of whether the denial of judgment as a matter of law should have
been granted below because defendants waived the point by declining
to appeal it.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
The Fourth Circuit was plainly correct in criticizing Judge Bennett's
jury instruction and in concluding that, at a minimum, the judgment
must be vacated and the case retried. The more controversial aspect
of the opinion is the determination that judgment as a matter of law
64. Id.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id. at 225.
67. Id. at 226 (quoting the Epic).
68. Id. (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 228.
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was warranted for the defendants under Milkovich regardless of
whether Snyder was a private figure. In this Part, I argue that the
Fourth Circuit's Milkovich analysis was weak in application and fun-
damentally flawed in principle. In so concluding, I do not reach the
larger question of whether judgment as a matter of law was warranted
on First Amendment grounds; that question is raised in subsequent
parts. The only question here concerns the soundness of the Fourth
Circuit's analysis.
The principal flaw in the Fourth Circuit's analysis is its failure to
recognize that the tortious wrongdoings for which Snyder was seeking
recovery were not reputational attacks. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, and the rhetorical hyperbole
case law leading up to Milkovich all confronted the following ques-
tion: If a speaker makes fiery, critical statements about the plaintiff
and does so in the context of staking out a very strong opinion, can the
plaintiff sue for the injury inflicted by those statements? 72 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that the key issue is not whether
the defendant is staking out a strong opinion; statements of opinion
may well be actionable under the First Amendment.73 The issue is
whether what the defendant has said about the plaintiff amounts to
asserting something that may be provably false. If the language on its
face asserts something provably false, it is still possible that it is not
actionable, because the context may be such that a reasonable reader
would not understand it to be meant literally. For example, in Green-
belt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler, the defendant
newspaper quoted citizens using the word "blackmail" to criticize the
conduct of the plaintiff, a real estate developer who was pressuring a
city council to approve a project; the Court thought a reasonable
reader would not understand the defendant as actually asserting that
the crime of blackmail had occurred, but rather as criticizing the plain-
tiff for his use of financial prominence and power in lobbying for him-
self.7 4 In Falwell, the defendant had published an "interview" in
which the Reverend Falwell allegedly described himself as losing his
virginity to his mother in an outhouse; read in hindsight through the
lens of Milkovich, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the defen-
72. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 1; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
73. Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) ("No reader could
have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their
words were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even
the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyper-
bole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely
unreasonable.").
74. Id. at 13-14.
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dant plainly had not put forward these statements as genuinely true-
Falwell was being attacked for what the defendant regarded as
hypocrisy.75
The problem with this framework as applied to Snyder is that Sny-
der's principal claim is not that he was emotionally injured by a
reputational attack. To be sure, there were defamation claims, but
these were thrown out;76 moreover, it can be conceded that the IIED
claim as applied to the Epic was arguably about the injuriousness of a
reputational attack. The core of the claim against the Phelpses was
instead that they seriously interfered with Snyder's ability to grieve
properly for his son by staging a media circus at his funeral and that,
in so doing, they caused him severe emotional distress and interfered
with his privacy.77 The picketing-based claim was not about attacking
the plaintiff's reputation or about attacking his son's reputation.
The Fourth Circuit was aware of this slippage at least to some ex-
tent, but it addressed it only briefly. "Although the Supreme Court in
New York Times specifically addressed the common law tort of defa-
mation, the Court explained that its reasoning did not turn on the pre-
cise 'form in which state power has been applied."' 78
Accordingly, the Court later applied the First Amendment to other
torts not involving reputational damages, and we have applied the
Court's controlling principles to other state law torts. Thus, regard-
less of the specific tort being employed, the First Amendment ap-
plies when a plaintiff seeks damages for reputational, mental, or
emotional injury allegedly resulting from the defendant's speech.79
The Fourth Circuit's extension of defamation principles is given a
boundary by reference to Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.so in footnote 11:
"The Supreme Court has deemed the First Amendment defense inap-
plicable to a state law tort claim only when the plaintiff seeks damages
for actual pecuniary loss, as opposed to injury to reputation or state of
mind."81
To the extent that the Fourth Circuit's extension of Milkovich be-
yond the torts of libel and slander is based on the idea that the Su-
75. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 48.
76. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572-73 (D. Md. 2008).
77. Id. at 572.
78. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)).
79. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
80. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). The Fourth Circuit's parenthetical reads
as follows: "concluding that First Amendment did not bar economic damages resulting from
defendant's tortious breach of promise." Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 218 n.11 (citing Cohen, 501 U.S.
at 671).
81. Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 218 n.11 (citing Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671).
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preme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is anti-formalistic, the
Fourth Circuit is surely correct. More particularly, it is clear that the
Court will not permit the technicality of which legal claims have been
pled in the complaint to determine whether the First Amendment is
applicable. 82 Most relevantly, invasion of privacy claims plainly re-
ceive significant First Amendment protection, and the Court expressly
struck down an IIED verdict in Falwell on New York Times v. Sulli-
van-related principles.83 Finally, the Fourth Circuit's own much-her-
alded opinion in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. showed
that, while a tort claim itself might stand up to First Amendment scru-
tiny, if the damages sought were essentially the same as they would be
in a defamation claim and so the claim appeared to be something of
an end run around the protections of Sullivan and its progeny, then
tough-minded First Amendment scrutiny would be applied to such a
case notwithstanding the different torts involved.8 4
Yet the Fourth Circuit went far beyond any of the principles just
articulated because Snyder presents an entirely different fact pattern
from those above. Food Lion involved a claim by a national super-
market chain whose alleged grossly unsanitary practices were the sub-
ject of a nationally broadcast ABC investigative report, which
included videotape by undercover ABC reporters who had obtained
clerical jobs at one or two of the stores.85 Food Lion's stock plum-
meted after the ABC broadcast, and it sued ABC, seeking damages
for the harm ABC had inflicted through its tortious conduct. 86 How-
ever, aware of the difficulties of proving a libel case, Food Lion ar-
gued that the investigative reporters trespassed on their land,
defrauded Food Lion into offering them jobs, and breached a duty of
loyalty to Food Lion once they had become employees.8 7 The jury
found for Food Lion on these tort claims and awarded large compen-
satory damages because of the stock plunge Food Lion suffered after
these broadcasts.88 The Fourth Circuit accepted the finding of liability
on these torts and nominal damages associated with them, but it did
not permit the stock plummet damages because it regarded these as
reputational damages for which Food Lion had found a back door.89
82. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1988).
83. Id. at 51-53.
84. Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1999) (post-Sullivan
principles applied to claims for fraud, breach of duty of loyalty, and trespass).
85. Id. at 510-11.
86. See id. at 511.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 523-24.
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Snyder's case is quite unlike Food Lion's. The injury for which Sny-
der sought a remedy had nothing to do with a reduction of Snyder in
the eyes of his community. Indeed, it had nothing to do with the com-
munity coming to think of Snyder as a bad person in any way. Like a
nuisance claimant, Snyder alleged that there was activity in his own
private life that he was entitled to experience without unreasonable
interference, and that the Phelpses intentionally-or at least know-
ingly and recklessly-interfered with that experience. 90 The Fourth
Circuit was correct in noting that the picket signs were not about Sny-
der, with the possible exception of two that used the second person
pronoun "You're Going to Hell" and "God Hates You." 91 Yet it in-
ferred from this that the claim would fail the Milkovich test.92 In so
doing, the Fourth Circuit was getting things exactly backwards. The
fact that Snyder was not being targeted for a reputational attack
shows that the wrong for which Snyder was suing was not some form
of reputational attack and that therefore even a broadened version of
Milkovich cannot dispose of the claim.
An exaggerated hypothetical might clarify the fallacy of the Fourth
Circuit. Suppose that the signs held by the Phelpses were used as
weapons in a physical thrashing and beating of persons on the side-
walk in Westminster, Maryland. No one would say that, given the
nonverifiability or nonfalsifiability of the contents of the signs, there
could be no battery claim. Or suppose that a loud rap group has a
band practice in the house next door to me every night from 1 a.m.
until 5 a.m. for six months straight. If I were to sue for nuisance, it
would not be necessary for me to prove that some of the lyrics of the
rap songs were verifiable or falsifiable statements about me. The
wrong alleged in Snyder was the interference with the solemnity and
privacy of a funeral for a beloved family member by an extremist po-
litical demonstration, not any reputational attack. It is neither here
nor there whether the signs contained verifiable statements, for the
right to say what was said is not what is being contested. The right to
interfere with the family's mourning is what is contested, and the legal
status of the alleged right does not turn on whether the contents of the
signs were verifiable.
The Milkovich critique is more plausible as to the aspects of the
claim that emerge from consideration of the Epic. The Epic actually
did contain many statements about the plaintiff and was, in some
sense, a reputational attack. The Fourth Circuit's analysis of some of
90. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 213 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
91. Id. at 224.
92. Id. at 219.
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the language in the Epic was quite justifiable. For example, when the
defendants stated that "God rose up Matthew for the very purpose of
striking him down, so that God's name might be declared throughout
all the earth,"93 their language would seem to be beyond the realm of
the verifiable. Other parts of the Fourth Circuit's analysis are less
plausible. The defendants named Matthew Snyder's parents and as-
serted certain statements about how they raised Matthew: "'Albert
and Julie . . . taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to
commit adultery. They taught him how to support the largest
pedophile machine in the history of the entire world, the Roman
Catholic monstrosity.... They also, in supporting satanic Catholicism,
taught Matthew to be an idolater." 94
It is hard to understand the Fourth Circuit's determination that
these are not the sorts of statements that could be proved false. The
court simply appears to be saying that a reasonable reader would un-
derstand the defendants to be engaged in a sort of hysterical venting
that was not founded on genuine information as to how Matthew's
parents in fact reared him and what they in fact taught him. Perhaps
that is so, but that is quite different from statements that contain rhe-
torical or figurative language. Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit might
have believed that a reasonable reader would understand the defend-
ants to mean that the uncontroverted facts of Matthew's upbringing-
being raised Catholic by parents who themselves went on to di-
vorce 95-was equivalent to a "teaching" of the form they decry, and
that assertion of an equivalence was itself not verifiable or falsifiable.
While such a broad reading of Milkovich is consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's precedent, there is ample reason to think that Chief Justice
Rehnquist was aiming for a far less defendant-indulgent conception of
protection for opinion in that case; indeed, it is widely recognized that
the fact pattern before the Court in Milkovich itself would have been
categorized as non-actionable by many courts in light of the fiery rhe-
torical context in which it appeared, but the Court insisted that since
the content of the assertion was itself factual, the First Amendment
protection did not cover it.96
Let us put aside the Epic and assume arguendo for the remainder of
this Article that the Fourth Circuit's disposal of Snyder's claims inso-
far as they were based on the Epic was justifiable. Nonetheless, the
court's analysis of Snyder's claims concerning the funeral picketing
93. Id. at 225.
94. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the Epic).
95. See id.
96. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990).
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was clearly unsound. Snyder was not seeking redress for a reputa-
tional attack but for an interference with the privacy of his grieving
and the infliction of emotional distress precipitated by the interfer-
ence. Pointing out that the words on the signs were nonfalsifiable is
utterly nonresponsive to these claims. Were the invasion of privacy
and IED claims simply tactics for avoiding the U.S. Supreme Court's
defendant-protective defamation precedents, as the fraud and trespass
claims in Food Lion were, that would be a different matter. There is
no reason, however, to believe that was the case. The tactical avoid-
ance in Snyder is the Fourth Circuit's, not the plaintiffs; the Fourth
Circuit understandably wanted to avoid the difficult question of
whether Falwell-level protection applies to a claim brought by a pri-
vate figure and therefore tried to resolve the case with Milkovich,
which applies to public figures and private figures alike. For better or
worse, Milkovich does not suffice to resolve Snyder.
IV. OUTRAGEOUSNESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CRITIQUE OF IIED
The Phelpses themselves have understandably supported the Fourth
Circuit's Milkovich analysis in arguing to the Supreme Court that the
Fourth Circuit's decision should be affirmed, despite the weaknesses
of that opinion.97 They have also argued that Albert Snyder was a
limited purpose public figure-a remarkably implausible position,
given that the conduct upon which they premise Snyder's limited-pur-
pose public figure status occurred after the defendants' allegedly tor-
tious conduct.98 Ironically, the strongest argument for the Phelpses is
one suggested by the petitioners' framing of the issue: it is the proposi-
tion that Falwell's requirement of actual malice in an IIED claim
should apply to private figures and public figures alike, as long as the
speech upon which the plaintiff's claim is predicated relates to a mat-
ter of public concern.99 Although the Phelpses do not seem to have
taken that position as a general matter, the Supreme Court of Arizona
adopted a similar view in Citizens Publishing Co. v. Miller.100 Nota-
bly, Professor Eugene Volokh, a First Amendment scholar at UCLA
School of Law, has written two articles and several blog posts taking
97. Brief for Respondent Opposing Writ of Certiorari at *16-17 & n.1, Snyder v. Phelps, 130
S. Ct. 1737 (2010) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 271323.
98. See id. at *19.
99. Id. at *16.
100. Citizens Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107 (Ariz. 2005).
2011] 489
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
this positiont1 and, with the help of an education foundation and
other First Amendment scholars, submitted an amicus brief advocat-
ing this position in Snyder.102
Volokh's argument seizes upon language in Falwell that appears to
cast doubt on the legitimacy of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress through outrageous conduct.
"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageous-
ness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow
damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an
adverse emotional impact on the audience.103
This set of observations by the Falwell Court does not appear to de-
pend at all on the status of the plaintiff as a public figure. Rather,
argues Volokh, it relies on the vague and subjective nature of the con-
cept of outrageousness in the tort of IIED. Vagueness is both a due
process problem and a speech-chilling problem, since one cannot pre-
dict which statements will be deemed outrageous and this uncertainty
would be more likely to generate self-censorship. Subjectivity is a
problem for similar reasons; more generally, the law cannot be used as
a tool for a community simply to punish speech that its members hap-
pen to find offensive. Both of these First Amendment vices exist re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private figure.
The logic of the argument implies that unless the speech in question is
provably false-in which case it has no First Amendment value-the
tort of outrage as applied to a case involving political speech is a viola-
tion of the First Amendment, whether the plaintiff is a private figure
or a public figure. For the sake of completeness, Volokh adds that
Snyder's successful invasion of privacy claim under Maryland law was
similarly untenable as a matter of First Amendment doctrine because
the concept of "offensiveness" critical to that tort is vague and subjec-
tive in just the ways that "outrageousness" is in IIED.
This principled argument, allegedly rooted in the reasoning of
Falwell, is buttressed by a classic First Amendment slippery slope ar-
gument. If this hysterical anti-gay speech at a peaceful funeral picket-
101. See generally Volokh, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, supra note 17, at 300.
See also Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 17; Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Origi-
nal Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IowA L. Ruv. 249 (2010).
. 102. Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education et al. as Amici Curiae, Sny-
der v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2826987 [hereinafter Rights in Edu-
cation Amicus Brief].
103. Volokh, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, supra note 17, at 303.
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ing is deemed to be unprotected, then a huge array of potentially
provocative speech may suddenly be subject to legal sanction or re-
striction, including political cartoons ridiculing Muslims, politically in-
correct speech on college campuses regulated by college speech codes,
threatening anti-immigration statements in the newspaper, and so on.
So long as these kinds of speech might be found outrageous by a jury
and a plaintiff is willing to say he was emotionally harmed, there is a
possible claim. The chilling effect would be enormous.
Initially, there is a serious problem with this Falwell-based defense
of the Phelpses' position: it is not a tenable reading of what Chief
Justice Rehnquist said in Falwell or of the Supreme Court's fact/opin-
ion jurisprudence more generally. The defense takes Chief Justice
Rehnquist's commentary about IIED in Falwell out of context.
Falwell involved a reputational attack by Hustler in the context of a
satirical critique of Falwell, who was plainly a public figure.104 The
central question of the case was whether an infliction of emotional
distress tort could proceed without proof that there was a statement
seriously put forward by Hustler as true, which Hustler either knew
was false or uttered indifferent to its truth or falsity.1 0 5 In short, the
question was whether this emotional distress tort could sidestep the
need for actual malice and falsity that exists in a defamation claim
involving a public figure.10 6 The Court held that, in the context of a
satirical critique of a public figure, the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress tort could not proceed without a showing of actual mal-
ice; Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that this sort of political satire of
public figures lay at the core of what the First Amendment pro-
tected. 07 In constructing this argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist was
clearly operating within the Gertz mindset, in which those who enter
public life to the extent that Falwell did must be ready to withstand
the blows of hard-hitting political speech. 08
Having lost that battle as a general matter, Falwell argued further
that because the conduct only generated liability under Virginia law if
the jury deemed it outrageous, the First Amendment protection
should give way; in short, Falwell ultimately argued for an exception
from the general First Amendment holding based on the fact that an
especially egregious sort of conduct was being targeted-that which a
104. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
105. See id. at 50.
106. See id. at 49.
107. See id. at 53-54.
108. See id. at 52.
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jury found outrageous.109 The Rehnquist language quoted by Volokh
is a rejection of that plea for an exception. Chief Justice Rehnquist
expressed a lack of confidence in the capacity of the outrageousness
concept to cabin the exception to the First Amendment protection for
political satire of a public figure that the Court had already decided
was critically important. 0 The Court was not expressing a view that
there was a vagueness and subjectivity problem in the concept of out-
rageousness that prevented IIED from figuring as a defensible state
tort.'I
There is an important dialectical response to this objection to
Volokh's argument; to be fair to Volokh, the more limited significance
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's language simply shows that Falwell itself
should not be interpreted as reaching out to make Volokh's larger
point about the tort of IIED. It leaves open the question of whether
the Court should hold that any version of IIED utilizing the concept
of outrage must fall under the First Amendment even in private-figure
cases. As to that question, Volokh's position is cogent: the vagueness
and subjectivity of outrageousness demand rejection of IED in cases
involving political speech.112 A more detailed articulation of his view
is presented on his well-known blog, The Volokh Conspiracy:
Yet, partly for the reasons that the Court gave in Hustler, such
speech is an important part of public debate. It should not be pun-
ished with multi-million-dollar liability, or even with college discipli-
nary sanctions. And it should not be deterred by the risk of such
liability-a risk that is inevitable given the vagueness of the "outra-
geousness" standard: "[W]here a vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensi-
tive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to
inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevi-
tably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . . than
if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
And such speech should also not be restricted using standards
that leave jurors, university administrators, and other government
decisionmakers free to impose liability based on the viewpoint of
speech, under the vague and subjective "outrageousness" test. One
defender of the Snyder verdict views the subjectivity as a virtue:
"The determination of when this behavior crosses the line into out-
rageous conduct is rightly left up to a jury that will apply its own
notions of reasonableness to decide what conduct should rise to the
level of liability." "Civil action judgments 'reflect social conven-
109. Id. at 55.
110. See id. at 56.
111. See id.
112. Eugene Volokh, My Short Essay on Snyder v. Phelps, Part I: The Wisdom of Hustler v.
Falwell, Tin- VOLOKII CONSPIRACY (May 24, 2010, 5:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/24/my-
short-essay-on-snyder-v-phelps-part-i-the-wisdom-of-hustler-v-falwell/.
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tions and tend to reflect what the majority believes' to be acceptable
behavior." But the Supreme Court rightly said that such an ap-
proach is not permitted under the First Amendment:
[Iff arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be pre-
vented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 13
Thus, even conceding that the Falwell Court was criticizing the
vagueness and subjectivity of the concept of outrageousness only in
the context of political satire of public figures, Snyder forces us to ask
the broader question: Is the concept of outrageousness too vague and
subjective to serve as a standard of liability, particularly in cases in-
volving political speech?114 Once that question is asked, Volokh as-
serts, the answer is blindingly obvious: yes, the concept of
outrageousness is too vague and subjective to serve as a standard of
liability, especially when political speech is involved. 115 Alert to the
presence in Snyder's jury verdict of a privacy tort that does not ex-
pressly turn on outrageousness, Volokh cleverly suggests that the cen-
tral place of the requirement that the privacy invasion be "offensive"
in the intrusion tort is essentially a variation of the notion of "outra-
geousness" in IIED and suffers from all of its constitutional infirmities
as well." 6
Before turning to a closer examination of the extent to which outra-
geousness and the IIED tort are vague, it is worth pausing to examine
two questions. First, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress through outrageous conduct is just one of many areas in which
nonspecific concepts and language are used in tort law; how can tort
law be acceptable in a constitutional system that purports to take seri-
ously concerns about vagueness and subjectivity? Second, why does
the vagueness doctrine-which has its principal constitutional identity
as a shield in criminal law cases challenging criminal law statutes-
also arise in speech cases and sometimes see use as a shield against
speech-restricting doctrines? The former question is the topic of the
next Part of this Article. The latter merits at least a brief response.
113. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting without citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972); Chelsea Brown, Note, Not Your Mother's Remedy: A Civil Action Response to




116. See Volokh, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, supra note 17, at 307-08.
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The vagueness doctrine in constitutional law is rooted in the Due
Process Clause.' 17 It was originally used to challenge criminal statutes
that did not identify prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to
provide adequate notice and to constrain the conduct of legal decision
makers, such as judges and prosecutors." 8 Both in theory and in prac-
tice, vagueness arguments have been used to support due process criti-
ques of regulations, ordinances, and regulatory enforcement actions
beyond the criminal area.1 9 Vagueness arguments have also been
used to support criticisms of the language of jury instructions, typically
in connection with the authority of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.120 In the past twenty years, defendants at-
tacking state punitive damage laws have persuaded several Justices to
anchor their critiques in the Due Process Clause and to utilize vague-
ness arguments in supporting that critique.121 Vagueness has been
used as a shield in several different strands of First Amendment case
law.122 To a significant extent, however, the original First Amendment
vagueness cases were also criminal law cases in which the criminal
statutes in question targeted either speech or associations and sought
to inflict criminal responsibility for expression of ideas or associa-
tion.123 Vagueness was viewed as a problem of constitutional moment
in criminal cases and a fortiori in criminalized speech cases.124
To a great extent, the vagueness doctrine counteracts law that re-
stricts two types of liberty: the liberty to do the proscribed acts, and
the liberty to be free of the punishment imposed for doing the pro-
scribed acts. In criminal free speech cases, the proscribed conduct is
speech, making the liberty interest especially important in constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Thus, to a great extent, vagueness critiques in
free speech cases are simply a special application of the vagueness
doctrine more generally, with special solicitude for the substantive lib-
erty-freedom of speech-that is, in effect, restricted by overly vague
law. Insofar as vagueness critiques are available where civil rather
than criminal liability is in play, this is in part because the notice short-
comings that bedevil vague laws have a chilling effect, diminishing the
117. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010).
118. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
455 U.S. 489 (1982).
119. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
120. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
121. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003).
122. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853
(1991) (setting forth and analyzing the role of vagueness in free speech cases and placing it in the
context of the overbreadth doctrine).
123. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
124. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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public good that the Court has deemed part of the purpose of the First
Amendment, and in part because freedom of speech is deemed of
such constitutional moment. Finally, as Richard Fallon has explained,
vagueness in free speech cases that is playing a role different from that
which it plays in non-free speech cases is essentially a form of First
Amendment overbreadth analysis.125 Because overbreadth analysis is
essentially about whether a legislative text should be struck down
facially and because Snyder is a common law case, Volokh's vagueness
is not properly interpreted as an overbreadth analysis.
Bringing all of these points together, the vagueness and subjectivity
critique of Snyder shares the two major features of classic "due pro-
cess" vagueness critiques: lack of clarity and objectivity (1) provides
speakers with inadequate notice of what is proscribed, which is incon-
sistent with rule-of-law values, overly restrictive of an autonomy-
based liberty of speech, and contrary to the ideal of a robust market-
place of ideas, and (2) creates the opportunity for pernicious selectivity
in enforcement. With this in mind, the next Part turns to a discussion
of whether the vagueness of tort law presents a sharp conflict with the
due process values underlying the vagueness doctrine and, if not, why
not.
V. INTERLUDE: THE OPEN TEXTURE OF TORT LAW
In his landmark book The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart recognized
that legal terms and concepts operate with various levels of precision,
crispness, and clarity.126 In many cases, lawmakers formulate a policy
and then enact a piece of legislation with clean edges in order to en-
sure that the policy is implemented clearly and effectively. For exam-
ple, one might wish to minimize the occurrence of injuries caused by
intoxicated drivers and therefore enact a statute under which any per-
son driving with a blood alcohol level of .08% thereby commits a fel-
ony. In other cases, however, one might want to provide guidance for
the resolution of various disputes in a manner that accords with social
norms and is deemed fair and balanced, and one might to this end
entrench in the law a far less clear norm. For example, one might hold
persons liable for accidental injuries they caused only if the person
failed to exercise the care a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised under the circumstances. Hart described the occurrence of
such legal concepts as reasonableness as the "open texture" of the
125. See Fallon, supra note 122, at 905.




law.127 He rightly commented that in statutes-where language is
used to articulate rules-the language is often not as sharp-edged as
some would wish. 128 The fuzziness of language around the edges is
one of the ways in which law is open-textured.129 In common law sys-
tems where precedent rather than text serves the guiding role, the
need to find the most pertinent dimension(s) of resemblance to prece-
dent obviously serves to make the law quite open-textured.o30 A rich
vein of academic writing since Hart has used the term "standards" to
refer to more relatively open-textured provisions of the law, and
"rules" to refer to provisions with greater clarity. This literature has
set forth with great sophistication the pros and cons of both.13' In any
event, it was clear to Hart and should be equally clear to us today that
tort law is chock full of standards and is as open textured as any area.
To the extent that Volokh's challenge is based upon what is essentially
the open-textured nature of the concept of outrageousness in the tort
of IIED, we must be ready to ask ourselves how much of tort law
would survive the constitutional scrutiny that Volokh and the Phelpses
are aiming to apply.
I intend to come at these questions from the opposite end, however:
assuming, as we must, that tort law in general cannot be unconstitu-
tional, how is it that tort law is consistent with due process, notwith-
standing its heavy dependency on open-textured concepts? The short
answer is that the nature of tort liability is very different from that of
criminal liability or liability under a regulatory regime and that, in any
event, tort law contains many features that cabin the potentially prob-
lematic aspects of open-textured predicates. Both parts of this answer
require explanation.
Criminal statutes, criminal ordinances, civil ordinances, and civil
regulations constitute rules of conduct announced by the state in or-
der for the state to regulate citizens' conduct. In setting down such
statutes and ordinances, the state is, in effect, giving notice of rules
that will be binding. The power to enact the rules at all carries with it
the power to sanction individuals for non-compliance with those rules.
It is part of our conception of due process that those who are expected
to comply and will be punished for non-compliance must have been
given notice of the rules. Each citizen's vulnerability to sanction for
127. Id. at 128.
128. Id. at 128-29.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 132-33.
131. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARv. L. Riv. 22 (1992).
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non-compliance with a rule is conditioned on the rule's having been
sufficiently published to constitute prior notice. Norms demanding
some level of clarity-and concomitantly prohibiting certain levels of
vagueness-are part-and-parcel of the criteria for sufficient ex ante
publication of the enforceable rules of conduct.
Tort liability does not work this way. 1 3 2 The imposition of liability is
not the sovereign's carrying through on the threat of liability for non-
compliance with an enforceable rule of conduct. Tort claims, unlike
criminal prosecutions or regulatory enforcement actions, are claims by
allegedly injured parties seeking redress for having been wrongfully
injured. A tort plaintiff uses the court to seek this redress; he aims to
exercise a right to exact damages from the one who wrongfully injured
him. When a court imposes financial liability on a defendant, it ac-
cedes to the plaintiff's demand that liability be imposed on the defen-
dant to pay damages to the plaintiff. Liability imposition is not a
sanction for non-compliance but an empowerment of a wrongfully in-
jured party. The reason a defendant is vulnerable to the plaintiff's
claim as facilitated by the court lies in the defendant's having wrong-
fully injured the plaintiff, not the defendant's having broken a rule.
To be sure, the defendant's vulnerability to a tort claim also depends
on law, but it depends on the precedents for such acts of empower-
ment by courts. The precedents will, in turn, build upon various no-
tions of wrongs-like battery, trespass to land, medical malpractice,
negligent infliction of physical injury, libel, and fraud-but the com-
mon law has never been understood by our constitutional tradition to
require any sort of crisp definition of those wrongs as a condition of
the constitutional permissibility of tort judgments. Indeed, while we
ought to remain vigilant of the importance of protecting a defendant's
vulnerability to a private individual's tort claims, we also ought to re-
main vigilant of the importance of protecting a plaintiff's individual
right to redress. Although there is an important sense in which tort
law implicitly contains norms of conduct and duties of conduct as part
of those norms, tort law's norms in the first instance are about which
injuries of others will count as injurings for which another individual
can be held accountable. The state's role is one of referee and en-
forcer when one individual demands to have another held responsible
132. The account of tort law and tort liability set forth here is fundamentally interpretive and
positive, not normative, and has been set forth in detail in several other places. See, e.g., JOHN
C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRoDuCIows TO U.S. LAW: TORTS
(2010) (explaining the civil recourse theory of tort law and distinguishing tort law from criminal
and regulatory law); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1998) (introducing civil recourse theory).
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to her; that is very different from the role of prosecutor and punisher.
The requirement for clear, advanced notice of the rules is, to at least
some degree, a safeguard of individuals insofar as they face prosecu-
tion and punishment by the state.
Apart from the distinctive nature of tort liability, tort law actually
contains numerous features that constrain its open texture. First, the
liability is overwhelmingly make-whole damages anchored in an ac-
tual injury. The anchoring of the liability in the plaintiff's injury is yet
another reason why our system has tolerated the open texture of tort
law. Deliberately vague standards become highly problematic when
the focus shifts from redress to regulatory sanction or punishment, in
part because one has lost the control provided by actual injury.
Secondly, the standards of tort law cut both ways in that defendants
are much more likely to be able to articulate a workable defense if the
domain of possible defenses is open textured, too. Indeed, as a distin-
guished tradition of American legal scholarship indicates, much of the
force of the "reasonableness" standard of personal injury law may be
understood as a remarkably broad range of exculpating factors.
In the third place, tort law's standards do not come out of the blue;
they are rooted in precedent that has accumulated and accreted over
long periods of time, often drawing upon particular cases with a kind
of judicial craft that is exacting in its own particular way. While po-
tential defendants cannot really be expected to glean notice from pre-
cedent, one of the concerns about vague standards is that too much
unbridled discretion is given to legal decision makers; in this context,
the pressures of precedent, stare decisis, and judicial craft that we find
in the common law are significant constraints.
With regard to judges, jurors, and citizens, the common law's roots
in social norms and social conventions provide another important con-
straint. The reasonably prudent person standard of negligence law,
for example, is meant to be an elaboration of the notion of ordinary
care. This standard is not aimed to draw attention to what economic
rationality would demand or what unvarnished moral truth would re-
quire; it is instead aimed to draw attention to what we conventionally
expect of one another by way of taking care and to place that inquiry
in the hands of ordinary people. Many of the standards of tort law are
thus aimed to be unambitious, undemanding, intuitive, and almost
second nature. While this is hardly notice in the sense that we con-
ceive the Constitution to require of the criminal law, it is a kind of law
and a kind of responsibility where one does not need demanding
notice.
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A fifth sort of constraint relates to a large portion of tort law, that
which involves accidents. To a significant extent, the liability in tort
for accidents arrives with a sort of responsibility attribution that has
been morally declawed; the social meaning of tort liability for a wide
range of accident cases is a far cry from that of punishment and, while
not fault-free, is plainly much less rooted in blame. At a concrete
level, tortfeasors are able to insure for their tort liability, and for a
wide range of legal actors, tort liability comes closer to being a cost of
doing business than a form of legal culpability. Although I (along
with Professor Goldberg) have cautioned against an overinterpreta-
tion of tort law as accident law and have insisted that even acciden-
tally caused injuries are framed by our tort law as "wrongs,"13 3 it is
fair to observe that, in connection with accidental injuries, tort law
plainly serves a compensatory and loss-shifting role in our legal sys-
tem, even if it also plays other roles. The constitutional norm of ad-
vance notice for punishable wrongs is attenuated to the extent that
our society's social understanding of tort law involves an understand-
ing of wrongs in this attenuated sense.
Conversely, there remain numerous torts that are plainly conceived
of as wrongs in a more full-blooded sense. Battery, conversion, and
fraud are the most stark examples, but the general category of inten-
tional torts is often considered to be quite different than accidental
torts precisely because the wrongs are in some sense more robust, and
the cost-shifting functionality of tort law does not seem to be a signifi-
cant part of what is driving it. The cost-of-business mentality here and
the phenomenon of liability insurance are often deemed wholly inap-
plicable, and so for these torts, one might think the notice problem is
relatively more significant. Yet there are two special constraints that
serve to alleviate due process concerns for just these sorts of torts.
Most obviously, everyone knows that hitting, stealing, and lying are
wrong, and these are torts that occur only when the defendant did this
wrongful act intentionally. The patent wrongfulness of these torts and
the intentionality built into their definitions counterbalance, to a sig-
nificant degree, their open texture.
VI. THE PUTATIVE VAGUENESS OF "OUTRAGEOUSNESS"
IN THE TORT OF IIED
I now turn from the open-textured nature of tort law generally to
the open-textured, and in some ways subjective, nature of the tort of




IIED, particularly in light of the central concept of "outrageousness."
When we understand just how IIED works and how outrageousness
figures within it, and when we recognize the many tools that tort law
uses to remain tolerable from a due process point of view, we will see
why the imposition of liability for IED is in principle far less prob-
lematic than it might first appear to be.
To the eyes of those who are unfamiliar with tort law in general or
with IIED in particular, it might seem that a tort with the name "in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress," which turns on findings of
"outrageousness," is among the most untethered. This would be ex-
actly backwards. In fact, because the kind of harm involved-emo-
tional distress-has always generated concerns about fraudulent
plaintiffs, IED is among the most heavily guarded torts.134 This be-
gins with the anchor in harm. Not only is it clear that the plaintiff
must demonstrate harm and that the harm must be deemed "se-
vere,"' 35 courts often engage in hard-nosed scrutiny of the evidence
proffered in support of their severity claim.136 While most cases do
not require proof of physical symptoms, some "have carried over the
requirement of physical manifestation or symptoms from the law of
negligent infliction of distress." 137 In any event, "[t]he case law is uni-
form that a person seeking to recover for this tort must show more
than minor or modest distress, and instead must have suffered severe
emotional disturbance." 1 3 8 "[T]he distress must be so severe that no
reasonable person should be expected to endure it."139
Similarly, the perception that the subjectivity of "emotional dis-
tress" and "outrageousness" creates a great degree of perilousness for
the essentially innocent defendant inverts the legal reality, at least as a
general matter. It would not be quite accurate to say that IIED is full
of defenses; rather, the pliability of the standards themselves has gen-
erally permitted defendants to cast their conduct and the plaintiff's
reaction as conduct that, while admittedly inappropriate and hurtful,
does not rise to the extraordinary level expected for the tort.140 Thus,
134. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KETION ON TFlE LAW OF TORTS 60-61 (5th ed.
1984) ("The requirements of the rule are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.").
135. 2 DAN B. DOBS, T1IE LAW OF TORTS 832 (2001).
136. See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 678 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (refusing to credit an
expert affidavit documenting the plaintiff's emotional harm). Cf DOBBS, supra note 135, at 833
(noting that "[s]ome decisions ... seem to be exceptionally demanding").
137. DOnBs, supra note 135, at 832 (citing Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997)).
138. RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILI1Y FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 45 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
139. DOBBS, supra note 135, at 832 (citing McQuay v. Guntharp, 963 S.W.2d 583 (Ark. 1998)).
140. KEETON ET AL., supra note 134, at 59 ("Our manners, and with them our law, have not
yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy in the form of tort damages for
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for example, it is not surprising that the hurling of racist epithets does
not usually generate liability1 4 1 or that the alleged sexually inappropri-
ate behavior in Jones v. Clinton was not deemed sufficient to state a
claim for IIED;1 4 2 regrettably, these sorts of behavior are not uncom-
mon. Courts frequently reject IIED claims as a matter of law on the
ground that the conduct was wrongful but not beyond the pale; the
outrageousness requirement is aimed to ensure that "misconduct caus-
ing emotional harm alone is actionable only when it is utterly intolera-
ble and goes beyond all bounds of civilized society,"14 3 all "bounds
usually tolerated by decent society." 1 4 4 The open texture of the tort of
IIED facilitates a remarkably supple means for defendants to craft
arguments that succeed in extricating them from liability.
The law of IED involves special sorts of judicial gatekeeping at
both the procedural and the substantive levels. The tort is typically
treated as having three or four elements (depending on whether, as in
Maryland, causation is separated out).14 5 The conduct by the defen-
dant must: (a) be outrageous and extreme, (b) be engaged in by the
defendant with the intention of causing emotional distress, or with
knowledge of or recklessness regarding the emotional distress it will
inflict on others, and (c) cause severe emotional distress.1 4 6 Although
each of these is a fact issue for the jury, the great majority of courts,
including those of Maryland, take the view on element (a) that the
court must make a preliminary determination on the issue of whether
the conduct could be found by a jury to be outrageous. The Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts explains this unusual feature:
The court, however, plays a more substantial screening role on the
questions of extreme and outrageous conduct and the severity of
the harm ....
A finding of extreme and outrageous conduct is as much a norma-
tive judgment as it is a finding of historical fact (although that is
often true of a finding of negligence).147
all intended mental disturbance. . . .There is no occasion for the law to intervene with balm for
wounded feelings in every case where a flood of billingsgate is loosed in an argument over a back
fence.").
141. DOBBS, supra note 135, at 830.
142. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 678 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
143. DOBBS, supra note 135 (citing the Restatement (Second)).
144. KEETON ET AL., supra note 134 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g
(1965)).
145. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977).
146. See DOBBS, supra note 135, at 832 (citing RESTATMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 46
(laying out these three elements in different order)).




The institutional need to keep bounds on the drift of the tort and the
liberty-based need to protect defendants against the whim of juries
are the principal rationales for this widely accepted feature of the tort.
As the quoted passage from the Restatement indicates, courts also are
more vigilant in scrutinizing the third element-the severity of dis-
tress-than is the case with other torts for largely the same reasons as
those just mentioned.
Most importantly, the judicial role in IIED is crucial at a substan-
tive level. Indeed, it is quite misleading to think of IIED as a single
tort whose principal conduct element is simply outrageous conduct.
One must understand that part of what it is to articulate the contours
of a tort-as Prosser famously did in his classic 1939 article on
IIEDT4 8-iS to identify what is in common in various scenarios in
which liability is imposed for a certain kind of injury. In doing so,
however, a tort scholar could be saying that what makes the infliction
of the injury constitute an actionable wrong is that this impermissible
aspect of the conduct exists (outrageousness, along with intentionality
and severe emotional distress, makes a sufficiently wrongful act to
warrant the imposition of liability, all considered in each instance).
But that is not, however, the only way to understand how it is that
some attribute of conduct comes to count as an element in the struc-
ture of a tort. Sometimes what is happening is that courts have identi-
fied a variety of different kinds of injurious acts that they are willing
to treat as wrongs, but theorists and courts-for a variety of systems-
reasons-need to identify a differentia or differentiae in common
among these in order to classify them as one tort.1 4 9 This is arguably
the best way to understand even such a basic tort as negligence: medi-
cal malpractice and carelessly inflicted injuries in auto accidents both
count as the tort of negligence, but the element of "negligence"-(or
"breach" or falling below "due care" ) common to both is not so much
the essence of the wrong as the differentia because of which they each
count as instances of the same tort.
As a historical matter-and perhaps as a conceptual matter too-
this is how outrageousness has functioned in the tort of IIED. Over
decades and even centuries, courts recognized clusters of cases in the
following areas: striking effrontery in dealing with passengers or
guests, vicious practical jokes, gross sexual misconduct and/or stalking,
and mishandling of the deaths, funerals, or corpses of family mem-
148. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REv. 874, 885-86 (1939).
149. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 134, at 60 (aspiring to induce core of tort).
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bers.o50 Prosser noted in all of these a level of intentional conduct that
was beyond the pale of social decency, and in this sense outrageous,
and used that concept to organize the set of sets, so to speak, in which
liability for intentional conduct causing emotional distress could be
found.' 5' It would be wrong to say that wherever there is intentional
conduct that a jury could find outrageous and that resulted in severe
emotional distress, there is liability. Judges and tort professors do not
understand the law this way, even if some plaintiffs and their advo-
cates are understandably drawn to using the tort in this fashion. It
would be closer to the mark to say that there is a variety of scenarios
that the law has developed in which inflicting emotional distress under
such circumstances, if it is serious enough and the conduct is inten-
tional, can count as an actionable tort, and we utilize the rubric of
IIED to process these claims. That too would not be quite accurate,
for part of what we do in the common law of torts is to remain open to
the development of new kinds of scenarios that are best understood as
constituting an actionable wrong, and the concept of outrageousness is
there to guide courts in thinking about when a putative case should be
said to belong to one or another kind of actionable scenario. In other
words, the capacity of "outrageousness" to serve as a guide in fleshing
out the open texture of tort law is part of its role, too. Additionally,
even if we are within such a scenario-for example, a practical joke
that in fact engenders severe psychiatric harm-courts are committed
to the proposition that there should only be liability if the jury finds
that the conduct in question lies beyond the outer edge of social
decency.152
It is therefore a serious understatement to say that there is substan-
tial judicial gatekeeping as to juries' findings on outrageousness. For
not only will courts make a preliminary determination as to whether
juries could so find, they will also scrutinize the record after the fact to
think about this as a matter on which courts carry power. Ascertain-
ing whether there is outrageousness requires placing the fact pattern
within the set of scenarios that do or should count as emotional tort
wrongs at all. The tort is not "acting outrageously and thereby caus-
ing severe emotional distress." The tort is a family of torts loosely
captured through the notion of outrageous conduct, and courts engage
in precedent-based reasoning with only incremental movement for-
ward in order to answer the question of whether the fact pattern war-
rants thinking that there is any tort there at all.
150. See id.
151. See Prosser, supra note 148, at 879-87.
152. RESTA-TEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 46 cmt. d.
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Two other aspects of our discussion of process protections in tort
law are exemplified by IIED: conventionalism and the insurability/in-
tentionality feature. It is often stated that conduct qualifies for the
tort only if it is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."153 Like-
wise, in the much quoted words of the Restatement (Second), "Gener-
ally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!" 54 These are highly
conventionalistic statements. The first effectively states that the con-
duct will not qualify unless it clearly falls well outside of the periphery
of basic standards of socially acceptable conduct. The second makes
effectively the same point, utilizing the automatic subjective responses
of the socialized ordinary person as a barometer of the degree to
which the conduct deviated from socially acceptable conduct; the con-
duct must fly off the conventionalism chart if it is to count as inculpat-
ing the defendant for the tort.
Scholars naturally criticize the vagueness and apparent circularity of
these principles, but this is really to miss what is happening. If one
thinks of the tort itself as imposing liability for intentionally, know-
ingly, or recklessly causing severe emotional distress through inten-
tional conduct done within certain kinds of scenarios-as cruel
practical jokes or extortion, for example-then the tort would be
quite cogent, but it would seem to carry quite a broad domain of lia-
bility. The requirement of conduct that everyone would call "outra-
geous" is, in effect, a decision narrowing this domain of liability in a
special way: by insulating defendants from liability except in the case
where the most basic familiarity with social norms and conventions
would lead everyone to recognize that the conduct was well beyond
the bounds of decency. My point here is not that this built-in protec-
tion suddenly makes the tort irreproachable; it is simply that the con-
ventionalism of the law's understanding of outrageousness serves to
diminish rather than exacerbate the notice problems others have at-
tributed to the tort.
Finally, like many torts that provide redress for non-physical harm,
the tort of IIED is by definition an intentional tort. There are many
reasons for an intentionality requirement: one is that, as in New York
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defamation or its equivalent' 55-the broad inclination toward a non-
liability regime runs into a contrary instinct in which legal actors are
willfully, maliciously, or recklessly inflicting injury upon others. An-
other reason, however, relates again to notice and, therefore, indi-
rectly to due process. Those who wish to avoid liability have complete
control over that decision; the intentionality requirement helps to en-
sure that we do not have accidental liability here, but only liability
where someone has deliberately chosen to behave in a way that they
know will inflict serious injury upon others.
VII. SNYDER V. PHELPS REVISITED
The analysis above allows us to think more carefully about the
vagueness attack on IIED in the context of Snyder. Preliminarily,
IIED claims are very much on the tort side of the tort/criminal divi-
sion. No state has passed a statute condemning "outrageous" conduct
or speech, nor has it laid down a recommendation to that effect. Curi-
ously, many states did in fact enact statutes to protect those at funerals
against picketers: the Phelpses were the principal precipitators of state
legislative action.156 Those statutes have been challenged in several
courts around the country with mixed results.'57 In any case, the
plaintiff Snyder was not acting as a private attorney general of Mary-
land demanding that some criminal or regulatory fine be handed out;
Snyder was suing for a wrong to himself.158 The question is not
155. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
156. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737
(2010) ("The Defendants have a substantial history of protesting at venues other than soldiers'
funerals. For example, on the day of Matthew Snyder's funeral, they also protested in Annapolis
at the Maryland State House and at the Naval Academy. The Defendants have also been in-
volved in litigation throughout the country relating to their protests. As a result of such activi-
ties, approximately forty states and the federal government have enacted legislation addressing
funeral picketing." (citations omitted)).
157. Id. Compare, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Neb. 2010)
(denying a motion to grant a preliminary injunction), with Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685
(8th Cir. 2009) (ruling that the Phelpses' First Amendment right prevailed against state interests
underlying a funeral picketing statue).
158. Snyder sought and obtained a large punitive damage verdict ($8 million, on top of a
compensatory damage verdict of $2.9 million), which the district court judge substantially re-
duced (from $8 million to $2.1 million) under the Maryland decision Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710
A.2d 267 (Md. 1998). Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 593-95 (D. Md. 2008). Bowden
requires trial judges to ensure that punitive damage verdicts are commensurate with defendants'
abilities to pay, are not duplicative, and comply with several other factors including those that
the Supreme Court has identified as critical. See 710 A.2d at 277. The district judge also ruled
that the punitive damage verdict complied with BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996) and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Snyder I, 533 F. Supp. 2d at
589-94. The verdict was, after all, below a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory. The Fourth
Circuit summarily rejected the Phelpses' appeal of the decision on constitutional due process,
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whether Maryland may utilize the concept of outrageousness in a legal
framework aimed at punishing the Phelpses for something they did
wrong, in which ex ante warnings of the legal duty would be neces-
sary. Similarly, we are not here dealing with a campus speech code.
Such codes-concern over which supplied the driving force of the
First Amendment scholars' amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Sny-
der-are campus-community analogues of criminal or regulatory
prohibitions which come from on high as a set of conduct rules de-
manding compliance."
The question in Snyder is whether Maryland may use the tort of
IED, with the concept of outrageousness that functions within it, to
empower Snyder to redress the injury done to him by the Phelpses.160
The fact that Snyder sought and received a substantial punitive dam-
age verdict does merit analysis, however, even apart from the fact that
the district court properly applied Maryland law to remit the damage
award to an amount commensurate with a private law conception of
punitive damages.161 Our analysis of IED and Snyder must address,
in the first instance, the right to obtain a judgment providing compen-
satory damages.
including it among several bases of appeal that the Fourth Circuit deemed to be "plainly without
merit." Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 216. The Phelpses did not petition for certiorari on any punitive
damage issues.
Notwithstanding my view that the district court fairly ruled that the damage verdict was within
the letter of Gore and Williams, under the rational reconstruction and extension of Williams I
have proposed in another article, the punitive damage verdict in Snyder I might still be deemed
constitutionally problematic. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Punitive Damages After Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 44 Cr. Ruv. 134 (2007).
159. See generally Rights in Education Amicus Brief, supra note 102.
160. The United States Supreme Court's most important decision cutting into state tort law is
probably New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and it is no accident that this case conspicuously
veered near criminal law in the eyes of the Justices. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The plaintiff was not
exactly a private party; he was a Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, suing in response to a
statement that did not name him as a private person but criticized governmental "authorities."
Id. at 256-57. There was no evidence of any actual injury or any reputational harm to him, and
the Court understood the claim as virtually an equivalent of a criminal libel action brought
through the instrument of state libel law. See id. at 277. Of course, First Ame'ndment libel law
has progressed enormously since Sullivan, and I am not suggesting a quasi-criminal aspect is
necessary in a tort case for First Amendment scrutiny, in particular, or constitutional scrutiny, in
general, to apply. The point is simply to note that our understanding of tort law as standing
apart from the constitutional scrutiny of legislation is not inconsistent with the broad swath of
cases flowing from Sullivan; rather, Sullivan's identity as the vehicle through which the Court
entered state tort law into Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny is yet further evidence that the state-
driven nature of the attack on a defendant is part of what renders constitutional scrutiny espe-
cially appropriate, and the privately driven nature is part of what has sustained a different and in
some ways more deferential level of constitutional scrutiny.
161. See generally Zipursky, supra note 158, at 134 (discussing punitive damages in Snyder and
explaining private law conception of punitive damages).
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The principal argument of Part VI was that despite first appear-
ances, the tort of IED and the concept of outrageousness within it
carry a range of attributes in light of which the tort quite easily com-
plies with due process norms and the norms of lawfulness more gener-
ally. At the core of this argument was the recognition that it is not
accurate to conceive of outrageousness as the trigger of liability.
Rather, outrageousness normally serves two functions, each of which
counts toward defendant protection rather than against it. In the first
instance, the concept of outrageousness is utilized in precedent-based
judicial reasoning and appellate review to bring together well estab-
lished clusters of scenarios in which sensitivity to the emotional well-
being of others is understood by our culture to be of paramount im-
portance, and insensitivity is therefore regarded as utterly unaccept-
able. Secondly, outrageousness is used as a sort of extra check; even if
the conduct itself falls squarely within a domain in which there is lia-
bility, the jury normally is required to find that the particular instance
of conduct was indeed outrageous and beyond all possible bounds of
decency. By requiring that the jury find the defendant's conduct to be
beyond the periphery of what virtually everyone understands to be
socially acceptable, the law is in effect securing a form of notice re-
quirement. Let us look at these two aspects of outrageousness on the
facts of Snyder.
First and foremost, the fact pattern in Snyder falls easily within one
of the best established clusters of IIED cases: defendants who inflict
emotional harm when dealing with the emotional sensitivities of those
who are attempting to cope with the death of a loved one. Magruder's
and Prosser's classic articles on emotional distress torts indicate that
"[m]ishandling of corpses has given rise to another large group of
cases where the courts have given redress for injured feelings." 62 As
Prosser noted, the law's willingness to recognize a right of action here
is not rooted in the idea that the corpse is a piece of property that
must not be damaged.163 Indeed, some of the oldest emotional dis-
tress torts involve imposition of liability on telegraph companies who
wrongfully delay transmission of a telegraph informing of someone's
death, thereby causing the plaintiff to miss the funeral of a close fam-
ily member.164 The idea is that even if individuals do not generally
162. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1064 (1936). See also Prosser, supra note 148, at 885-86 ("A number of decisions
have involved the mishandling of dead bodies, whether by mutilation, disinterment, interference
with burial, or other forms of intentional disturbance." (footnotes omitted)).
163. See Prosser, supra note 148, at 886.
164. See, e.g., Young v. W. Union Tel. Co., 11 S.E. 1044 (N.C. 1890).
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have a special claim on others to be vigilant of their emotional well-
being-or at least not a claim that rises to the level of salience and
seriousness that warrants recognition as an actionable legal right-
where the emotional well-being concerns efforts to endure the death
or dying of a family member, individuals do have a claim upon others
that they not act carelessly or recklessly to risk significantly interfering
with that emotional sensitivity.
Emotional distress claims brought by grieving family members are
no mere relic of the past. The intentional infliction of emotion dis-
tress tort continues to be utilized by plaintiffs in situations like those
originally noted by Magruder and Prosser, as demonstrated by the
2009 Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm.165 Unsurprisingly, a broader range of fact pat-
terns based on the same idea has emerged. All are rooted in the same
principle: a person's emotional sensitivity in regard to the death of
immediate family members justifies a high level of respect and regard
by others, and when that person is seriously emotionally injured by
another's failure to show adequate regard for that interest, a right of
redress exists in tort.
A successful claim for outrage and invasion of privacy from Florida
aptly illustrates this cluster of cases. Armstrong v. H & C Communi-
cations,166 like Snyder, involved a father (and mother) who claimed
that the defendant's outrageous conduct interfered with their grieving
the loss of a deceased child. Robert and Donna Armstrong's six-year-
old child, Regina Mae, was abducted in June of 1985, and her remains
were found by a construction worker two years later.167 A memorial
service was held on August 22, 1988, in Orlando.168 That same day, a
reporter for the defendant, which produced Channel 2 news, went to
the Oviedo Police Department and videotaped images of the child's
skull.169 On the evening of August 22, the Armstrongs were watching
Channel 2 news, which showed film footage of the memorial service as
well as a videotape of animal remains that were originally believed to
be the remains of Regina Mae. 170 "Then, the cameraman cut directly
to the Oviedo Police Chief removing her skull from the box, zoomed
in for a frontal close-up of the titled skull facing directly at the cam-
era,"' 7 ' and the voice-over described the skull as that belonging to
165. RiSTATEMENT (Tui]R), supra note 138, § 45 cmt. f.
166. Armstrong v. H & C Commc'ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
167. Id. at 280.
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Regina Mae Armstrong, who was being memorialized that day.1 72
The Florida appellate court had "no difficulty in concluding that rea-
sonable persons in the community could find that the alleged conduct
of Channel 2 was outrageous in character and exceeded the bounds of
decency so as to be intolerable in a civilized community." 73 "In-
deed," concluded the court, "if the facts as alleged herein do not con-
stitute the tort of outrage, then there is no such tort." 174
Similarly, an Illinois appellate court in Green v. Chicago Tribune
Co.17 5 recognized a mother's cause of action for IIED and invasion of
privacy against a defendant who had interfered with her time with her
fatally wounded son at a local hospital, both before and after the son
died.176 "Reasonable people could find that ... the Tribune's actions
... suggest an alarming lack of sensitivity and civility, and reasonable
people, in essence, a jury, could find the Tribune's behavior extended
beyond mere indignities, annoyances, or petty oppressions and consti-
tuted extreme and outrageous conduct."' 77 Green followed a similar
case from California, Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.,178 in which
a television crew entered a family home and filmed paramedics mak-
ing an unsuccessful attempt to rescue the plaintiff's husband and then
broadcast the film on television.1 79 Noting that the defendants ap-
peared to imagine that they could act with "impunity," and remarking
that the defendants' conduct suggested "an alarming absence of sensi-
tivity and civility," the court recognized a cause of action for IIED in
addition to one for trespass and invasion of privacy.180
The past few cases are only a sliver of the plethora of successful
IIED cases brought by severely distressed persons in connection with
the funerals of their loved ones. Given that tort law proceeds by lay-
ing down examples that reflect increasingly straightforward and easy-
to-grasp norms of conduct, it would thus be an inversion of reality to
see the vagueness, subjectivity, or uncertainty of the IED tort as a
constitutional reason to preclude Snyder's recovery. Our legal system
quite plainly understands family deaths as a special time for sensitivity
and family funerals as a place to be especially careful not to interfere
with what is probably life's greatest emotional vulnerability.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 282.
174. Id.
175. Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
176. Id. at 251.
177. Id. at 257.
178. Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
179. Id. at 670.
180. Id. at 682.
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Tort law's protection of the sensibilities of grieving family members
is of course rooted in our culture's respect for the importance and
solemnity of familial death. It is therefore no surprise that the same
value is also entrenched in the law of privacy-the other tort asserted
by Snyder. Strikingly, the most articulate expression of this principle
in the law is a unanimous decision issued by the Supreme Court in
2003, National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish.181 Fav-
ish required the Supreme Court to decide the privacy rights of family
members of Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clin-
ton.1 82 Foster committed suicide by shooting himself, and his body
was found in Fort Marcy Park on the outskirts of Washington, D.C.18 3
Color photographs were taken of the death scene.18 4 After investiga-
tions by the FBI, House and Senate committees, and the Office of
Independent Counsel (OIC) all ruled that it was suicide, a skeptical
citizen, Allen Favish, made a FOIA request for the materials underly-
ing those investigations, including the photographs.'1 5 The question
before the Court concerned the scope of a statutory exemption to
FOIA that excuses the government from the need to disclose records
that "'could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy,'" 18 6 which exemption the OIC had claimed
as a ground for declining to turn over the photographs in light of the
privacy interests of the Foster family members.' 87
In an opinion joined by all members of the Court, Justice Kennedy
ruled that the family members' privacy interests were so deeply rooted
in our culture and our common law that FOIA must be interpreted as
implicitly recognizing interests within the domain of privacy rights.
[W]e think it proper to conclude from Congress' use of the term
"personal privacy" that it intended to permit family members to as-
sert their own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed
impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.
Family members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and re-
spect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their
own.' 88
181. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
182. See id. at 160.
183. Id. at 160-61.
184. Id. at 161.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 160 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006)).
187. Id. at 164.
188. Id. at 167-68.
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Although Favish ultimately addressed a question of statutory inter-
pretation, a crucial premise of the decision was the Court's utterly
confident and well-supported assertion that the common law recog-
nizes a right of individuals grieving the loss of a family member
against intrusion of those asserting their First Amendment rights.
In short, the perception that the outrageousness criterion invites too
much subjectivity is really quite backwards, at least in the context of
the facts of Snyder; behind the circumstances of the case itself lies a
very rich common law and cultural history in the context of which the
plaintiff's claim easily passed the judicial threshold for IIED. In addi-
tion, of course, the jury had to find not only that the facts were as the
plaintiff alleged but also that the defendants' conduct within this par-
ticular scenario was indeed outrageous, and there is no reason to
doubt that the jury found exactly so.
Turning now to the conventionalistic aspect of outrageousness, Sny-
der is again remarkably strong. There is simply no question that the
Phelpses were fully aware that the conduct they engaged in is widely
considered to be a gross intrusion on family members' rights to a
grieving process free of their intrusion. The Phelpses were quite open
about the fact that they settled on their funeral-picketing of fallen
soldiers because it generated such extraordinary publicity;189 it plainly
generated publicity because of the shock, outrage, and anger with
which ordinary people around the country reacted. Similarly, insofar
as the intentionality of IIED is supposed to ensure that defendants do
not find themselves unwittingly attributed with responsibility imposed
by the state, the strategic cast of the Phelpses' activities again gives
reason to regard them as defendants who have been more than suffi-
ciently provided with notice.
As explained in Part VI, courts evaluating IIED claims require that
the plaintiff establishes severe emotional distress and typically demand
a substantial evidentiary record to support such a claim. Maryland
courts are no exception. In Harris v. Jones,90 the case in which the
Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized IIED as actionable within
the state, the court not only held that there must be sufficient evi-
dence of severe emotional distress, but actually reversed the interme-
diate appellate court because it deemed the evidence before it to be
insufficient.' 91 District Judge Bennett took seriously Maryland's re-
quirement that there be evidence of severe emotional distress and, in
his opinion upholding the verdict in Snyder, noted that "[p]laintiff's
189. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577-78 (D. Md. 2008).
190. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977).
191. See id. at 616.
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experts testified at trial that his depression and diabetes were exacer-
bated after the events of March 10, 2006."192 "While the doctors con-
cluded that it would be nearly impossible for Plaintiff to separate the
emotional impact of Defendants' actions from preexisting conditions
and from general grief over the loss of his son, they agreed that De-
fendants' actions had a significant impact." 93 The expert testimony
by physicians fortified Snyder's own testimony regarding the severity
of his response to the defendants' actions, including vomiting and cry-
ing for hours.' 94
Snyder v. Phelps thus possessed many of the attributes that permit
IIED to be consistent with constitutional values of due process, not-
withstanding its utilization of an open-textured concept like outra-
geousness; indeed, outrageousness is in some ways utilized to
strengthen the process protections of the tort. It must be said, how-
ever, that the district court's treatment of the case falls short in at least
one important respect. District Judge Bennett did not exercise his
power to engage in any sort of muscular review of the claim that the
conduct was outrageous. He did not appear to make a preliminary
finding or post-verdict finding on the question of whether the
Phelpses' conduct counted as outrageous. Such a review would have
included a survey of relevant IIED case law as well as a review of the
jury's finding on this after the fact. As to the doctrinal issue, the
court's failure was relatively trivial, since, as our analysis revealed, the
doctrinal case for an IIED action for intentional interference with a
family's grieving is extremely strong. As to scrutiny of the evidence
put forward to the jury on whether the defendants in this case were
acting outrageously, the district court's failure was more questionable.
Its review of the jury's finding in general, and on outrageousness in
particular, was very light. To the contrary, Judge Bennett deferred to
the jury, permitting it to weigh the value of the defendant's First
Amendment rights and to override those rights if it so chose.
While there were flaws in the district court's handling of the case-
and flaws that bear on concerns about the constitutionality of IED
torts in this setting-that would not be a sufficient reason to warrant
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. Recall that the flaw I
have just indicated was essentially the very same problem for which
the Fourth Circuit vacated the jury verdict: instructions that gave the
jury too much of the First Amendment question and circumvented the
court's own responsibility to engage in substantial oversight of the
192. Snyder I, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 572.
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protection due, as applied to the facts of the case. 95 The district
court's overempowerment of the jury warranted the Fourth Circuit's
vacating of the jury verdict. This is, however, a reason for remand,
not reversal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It seems intuitively obvious that the concept of "outrageousness"
within the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is among
the vaguest and most highly subjective standards our system ever uses.
It seems to follow that the tort of IIED scores too low in process val-
ues to withstand the sort of First Amendment scrutiny that a case like
Snyder v. Phelps appears to demand. The central goal of this Article
was to explain why this superficially appealing line of argument
should be rejected. Plainly, the concept of outrageousness does oper-
ate as a standard within the law of IIED, and plainly tort law itself is
quite standard-driven and open-textured. Greater understanding of
the IIED tort is required if one is going to undertake an assessment of
how vague the concept of outrageousness is and what sort of constitu-
tional problems, if any, are presented by its open-textured and to
some extent subjective nature. More generally, one should not think
about the constitutional implications of state tort law and its supposed
uncertainties without recognizing that state tort law meshes with con-
stitutional principles in quite a different way than the criminal and
regulatory law to which most vagueness analyses are applied.
When one does explore the tort of IED, one learns much that is
comforting from a constitutional point of view. The concept of outra-
geousness in IIED turns out to be, in important respects, a process
safeguard for defendants, not a wild card the state can use to punish
whomever it chooses. On one level, outrageousness has served as
something of a meta-concept to help courts bring together several dif-
ferent clusters of cases that were actionable, historically: extortion,
practical jokes that were sufficiently severe to inflict debilitating inju-
ries, and devastating insensitivity to those mourning the loss of a close
family member. On another level, the concept of outrageousness has
been used to add a level of second-checking for the jury; the conduct
in question must be something that community members so easily and
clearly identify as beyond the pale of social decency that it can be
fairly assumed that its unacceptability presents no notice problem and
is well understood. In this latter sense, the outrageousness require-
ment is part-and-parcel of what tort law does with intentionality; we
195. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 221 (4th Cir. 2009).
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are only willing to impose liability for a variety of non-physical inju-
ries-fraud, intentional interference with economic interest, invasion
of privacy-when the scienter level is high enough to rule out the pos-
sibility that defendants are innocently or inadvertently engaging in
conduct which is categorized as wrongful or tortious.
When Snyder v. Phelps is revisited from within a point of view that
takes the state tort law of IIED seriously, it becomes quite an easy
case. Interfering with a person's grieving of a family member is-after
the tort of assault-perhaps the oldest pure emotional harm tort there
is: the right of family members to be protected from such intrusions is
extremely well entrenched in the common law, as a unanimous Su-
preme Court expressly recognized in a different context only seven
years ago.196 It is no surprise that the jury found the Phelpses' con-
duct to be outrageous; the defendants themselves have explained that
they choose upsetting conduct for the very reason of attracting as
much attention as possible.' 97 In essence, the Phelpses were emotion-
ally injuring Snyder because doing so was provocative, and this pro-
vocativeness was the best way to make a point. In this context, to
suppose that there is an inherent vagueness or subjectivity at the core
of Albert Snyder's personal injury claim is to miss what the defend-
ants themselves see as plain as day.
POSTSCRIPT: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
IN SNYDER V. PHELPS
A. The Justices' Opinions in Snyder
Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion begins by declaring that
the First Amendment protects an individual's right to express his view
on matters of public concern, indicating that "'speech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,
and is entitled to special protection.'"1 9 8 Phelps and his followers
were expressing views on matters of public concern: war, homosexual-
ity, morality, America's involvements abroad, and its tolerance of ho-
mosexuality, among others; their verbal statements are therefore
entitled to a high level of First Amendment protection. The right to
picket peacefully on public streets regarding matters of public concern
is well established.
196. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-68 (2004).
197. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577-78 (D. Md. 2008).
198. Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, slip op. at 6 (Mar. 2, 2011) (majority opinion) (citing Con-
nick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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After distinguishing cases in which picketing was not fully pro-
tected, the Court turned to what it regarded as, potentially, a more
pertinent argument: that neutral time, place, and manner restrictions
are permissible even for highly protected speech, and that Snyder's
claim could be understood to assert that it was the funeral setting, not
the content of the speech, that generated liability.199 Ultimately, how-
ever, the Court rejected this argument quite decisively:
The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro's
picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message con-
veyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself. A group
of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood,
holding signs that said "God Bless America" and "God Loves You,"
would not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro
said that exposed it to tort damages.200
Having reached the view that it was a highly protected speech cate-
gory and that it was not content-neutral or viewpoint-neutral, the
Court then suggested that liability imposition could not be justified on
the ground that the defendants caused offense.201 Such speech cannot
be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt: "'If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'" 2 0 2
Finally, the Chief Justice addressed the argument that the defend-
ants should not be shielded from liability because the picketing was
"outrageous." Quoting Falwell, he reasoned that "'[o]utrageousness'
. . . is a highly malleable standard with 'an inherent subjectiveness
about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of
the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression."' 20 3 To wrap things up, Chief Justice Roberts
easily rejected the privacy and civil conspiracy claims, as well as the
captive audience doctrine;204 a footnote early in the opinion articu-
lates a procedural basis for the Court to limit its attention to the pick-
eting activities and ignore the "Epic" entirely.205 The opinion of the
Court concluded by declaring that this ruling is "narrow" and depends
on the particular facts found in the record, which, as a matter of First
Amendment doctrine, must be reviewed carefully. 206
199. Id. at 11-12.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 12-13.
202. Id. at 12 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
203. Id. at 16 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
204. Id. at 13-14.
205. Id. at 3 n.1.
206. Id. at 14-15.
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While Justice Breyer's concurring opinion simply reiterates the nar-
rowness of the holding and emphasizes that the Internet posting as-
pect of the case has not been considered, 2 0 7 Justice Alito's dissent
takes the opposite tack.2 0 8 On virtually every issue agreed to by eight
of the nine Justices, Justice Alito disagreed. While recognizing that
some of the Phelpses' speech was on issues of public concern, he ar-
gued that much of it was private and was directed at Snyder and his
son;209 relatedly, he rejected the Court's procedural argument that
there was no need to consider any of the Phelpses' conduct other than
the picketing itself.210 Justice Alito especially emphasized the inap-
propriateness of permitting defendants to escape liability when they
opportunistically selected this particularly intrusive and damaging
method of expressing their point.2 11 And he was highly critical of his
colleagues for their unwillingness to recognize a distinction between
public figures and private figures.212 Most significantly (for my pur-
poses in this Article), Justice Alito opined that "funerals are unique
events at which special protection against emotional assaults is in or-
der. At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is
particularly vulnerable." 213 And, like the argument put forward in the
body of this Article, Justice Alito's dissent argues that the require-
ments of IIED are difficult to meet and that it is a "very narrow
tort. "214
B. A Brief Critique of Chief Justice Roberts's Snyder Opinion
Preliminarily, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion merits criticism sim-
ply as a matter of form; most particularly, the opinion fails to confront
expressly the argument that Falwell's First Amendment shield against
IIED claims only applies to public figures, not to private figures.215
Prior to Snyder, it was beyond dispute in claims based on defamation
and related speech torts that "issue of public concern" status was not
necessarily enough to put the defendant in the highest tier of First
Amendment protection; under Gertz and its progeny, private-figure!
public-issue cases were less well protected than public-figure/public-
207. Id. at 1 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 1 (Alito, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id. at 7-8 n. 15.
211. Id. at 5.
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. at 11.
214. Id. at 2 (citing W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 12 (5th ed. 1984)).
215. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988).
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issue cases.216 To be sure, a majority of the Court did not always take
this view of the distinction between cases involving public figures and
those involving private figures prior to Gertz,217 and a dissent in Gertz
itself criticized the distinction. 218 Moreover, the opinion of the Court
in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell does not foreclose expansion of First
Amendment protection to private figures in IIED cases, even if it ex-
pressly limits its holding to public figures. However, there is no ques-
tion that the importance of the public-figure/private-figure distinction
was a baseline in Falwell2 19 and is now rejected, at least for Snyder and
IIED cases of a similar cast involving speech on issues of public con-
cern. It is striking, to put it gently, that such a decision would be made
silently, without any reference to the motivation of the public-figure/
private-figure distinction in Gertz.
Turning to substance, three aspects of Chief Justice Roberts's opin-
ion are especially noteworthy in light of the concerns of this Article.
First and most obviously, the opinion reasons that the concept of out-
rageousness is too subjective to be capable of overcoming the First
Amendment protection that is afforded to matters of public con-
cern. 220 While not precisely the vagueness argument anticipated
above, the Court's concern is nearly functionally equivalent: it is unac-
ceptable, the Court holds, to restrict speech by reference to a concept
that is so malleable that it generates vast discretion in those deciding
whether there shall be liability. Because outrageousness in the con-
text of IIED is in fact far more constrained than the Court recognizes
(as Part V showed) and because those constraints were respected by
the district court on the facts of Snyder (as Part VI showed), the
Court's analysis on this critical point is unsound.
Second, the Court's failure to grasp how the tort of IED applied to
this case also doomed it to an inadequate analysis of the content-neu-
trality issue. While Chief Justice Roberts was surely right to say that a
"group of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro
216. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-47 (1974) (distinguishing private fig-
ure cases, which offer less First Amendment protection than public figure cases).
217. See especially Justice Brennan's plurality Opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 47-48 (1971) (rejecting the view that cases involving matters of public concern
invoke less defendant protection if the plaintiff is a private individual, rather than a public
figure).
218. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 361, 363-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting distinction between
private and public figures).
219. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51 ("[P]ublic figures as well as public officials will be subject to 'vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks."' (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270));
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 57 n.5 (noting that the parties did not dispute that Falwell was a public
figure).
220. See Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, slip op. at 12 (Mar. 2, 2011) (majority opinion).
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stood, holding signs that said 'God Bless America' and 'God Loves
You,' would not have been subjected to liability," 2 2 1 the hypothetical
does not establish that liability was based on content or viewpoint. A
raucous, publicity-seeking group of provocatively clad, multiply-
pierced rockers holding provocative signs saying, "Love and Hot Sex,
Not War!" might have generated liability, if they had been sufficiently
opportunistic and media-seeking and had managed to transform Sny-
der's time of mourning into a national media circus. To the extent
that content and viewpoint matter, it is not because the liability is for
the content and viewpoint, or because the common law standard or
the jury instruction are in any way framed in terms of content or view-
point (they are not). It is because the core of the wrongful injuring
that constitutes the tort, on facts like these, has to do with an opportu-
nistic creation of a media sensation. It is a contingent fact (assuming
the plausibility of Chief Justice Roberts's hypothetical) that "God
Bless America" at a soldier's funeral would have triggered a very dif-
ferent (and entirely benign) set of predicate facts. It is not the words
or the ideas, the content or the viewpoint, but the willful elimination
of privacy and solemnity of the occasion (and the knowing or reckless
creation of severe emotional distress) that generates liability. Of
course, some words can and some words cannot be used as instru-
ments in bringing about that goal. That does not make the tort con-
tent- or viewpoint-based, however.
Finally, a central theme of the critique in this Article is that tort law
works very differently from criminal law or regulation. In the latter
areas, the state is empowered to impose sanctions for conduct it
wishes to prohibit, and it makes choices to prohibit certain conduct on
the basis of its potentiality for bringing about harm. Constitutional
standards determine both how the state may and must announce those
prohibitions and what sorts of harm will be adequate to justify certain
types of prohibition or regulation. This is plainly the paradigm of law,
specifically constitutional law, that Chief Justice Roberts had in mind
when he reasoned that the great distress of someone like Snyder is not
a sufficient harm to justify a prohibition of speech like the Phelpses'.
As I have argued at length above, the common law of torts does not
operate anything like Chief Justice Roberts's paradigm of law. The
question is not whether the state can sanction someone or implicitly
whether the state can set out prohibitions of conduct enforceable
through sanction. Nor is the question whether the right to express
certain views may be curtailed when the speech has a certain potenti-
221. Id. at 11-12.
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ality for causing offense or distress. Rather, tort law says that there
are certain ways that each of us is entitled not to be mistreated. It
allows individuals to come to court and demand redress on the ground
that they have been mistreated by the defendant in a manner that
courts have regarded as substantial. It tells courts that if the plaintiff
can establish that he was so mistreated, then he shall be entitled to
hold the mistreater accountable for having wrongfully injured him.
Albert Snyder's claim was that the Phelpses mistreated him by in-
tentionally wrecking the private mourning of his son with a vulgar me-
dia sensation at his son's funeral. The question is not whether the
state may regulate or prohibit this type of speech. It is whether the
state may permit accountability and individual recovery when one
person has emotionally harmed another under such circumstances. Of
course, it is in principle possible for a plaintiff or for the state to abuse
the soft-edged standards of tort law in order to conceal what is essen-
tially an effort to prohibit speech or regulate speech, to convert what
is first and foremost an offense or disagreement into emotional harm,
and then to convert the disfavored speech into outrageous conduct.
So there is, as the Supreme Court has known full well since it decided
New York Times v. Sullivan2 2 2 almost half a century ago, good reason
to be careful in scrutinizing what the state and its law are really trying
to do.
Had the Supreme Court really scrutinized the nature of the claim in
Snyder, it would have seen that the case is a genuine tort claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Had it understood how
IIED really works, it would have seen that it is an authentic tort, with
all its pluses and minuses. And it would have seen that the "outra-
geousness" and the other requirements within the IED tort itself are
not there as wild cards to allow unpopular speakers to be sanctioned.
On the contrary, these requirements exist to ensure that there will not
be liability unless there is a deliberate or reckless injuring; unless the
context is one in which it is understood that conduct of this sort is
unbearably intrusive and individuals are highly emotionally vulnera-
ble; and unless not only jurors, but judges, courts, and paradigms of
precedent indicate that the conduct goes well beyond a socially tolera-
ble way to interact with others. Had it recognized these things, the
Court would have seen that tort law has long permitted juries to hold
people accountable for breaching their duty to be vigilant of the emo-
tional need to mourn the loss of a close family member.
222. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Our nation's heroic free speech tradition surely does require that
our legal system often "bite the bullet" and protect speech that it
knows to be harmful. Constitutional rights must have the strength to
stand up to arguments of individual or social utility. But the challenge
of a rights-based legal tradition like our own is to find a way to define
those rights so that they harmonize with the duties we owe to others.
One would have thought-and our legal tradition has always
thought-that the norm of respect for those who are in mourning
would easily find a place in the domain of duties to others. Let us
hope that Snyder is not emblematic of things to come in the Roberts
Court, that the bright-line lure of free speech rights does not continue
to stand in complete and total domination over the softer-edged stan-
dards that guide courts in determining the duties that we owe to
others.
